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FUNDING PUBLIC
EDUCATION: A NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM*
The children of Demetrio Rodriguez attend the public schools of the
Edgewood Independent School District. This district, the "poorest" in San
Antonio, Texas, spends an average of only $356 per pupil each school year.'
Across town, "on the other side of the tracks," children residing in the
affluent Alamo Heights Independent School District receive an education
costing $594 per pupil, representing a yearly expenditure over 65 percent
higher than Edgewood's.2
Such inequities in educational services are caused by funding imbal-
ances attributable to state educational financing schemes. Under the
Texas system, the state is divided into autonomous school districts funded
by a combination of state aid or, "subvention," and district real property
taxation.' The state aid portion is distributed under the Minimum Foun-
dation Program.' This program seeks to insure that each school district has
sufficient funds to guarantee each of its children an adequate education.5
Additional funds, raised through real property taxation,6 permit the partic-
* This article is a student work prepared by Felix L. D'Arienzo, a member of the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
The wealth of each district is measured by the average property value per pupil and the
median family income of district residents. The figures for the Edgewood district for the 1967-
68 school year are $5,960 and $4,686 respectively. These figures are the lowest in the San
Antonio metropolitan area. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12 (1973).
For a discussion of how the per pupil expenditures are determined see note 4 infra.
2 For the 1967-68 school year, the assessed property value per pupil in the Alamo Heights
district exceeded $49,000; the median family income within the district is $8,001. Id. at 13.
1 Id. at 7-17. For a discussion of subvention see Note, Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case
for the Children, 18 CATH. LAW. 113, 125 (1972).
1 The state contributes 80 percent of the funds out of general revenues; the school districts
as a unit contribute 20 percent. Each district's input and return appropriation is determined
by a complex economic formula. The formula is designed to take into account each district's
ability to pay. 411 U.S. at 8-10.
Under the program, the Edgewood district, levying a property tax of $1.05 per $100 of
assessed value, raised $26 per pupil above its allotted portion of the state fund in the 1967-
68 school year. The district's appropriation under the Minimum Foundation Program was
$222 per pupil. With federal aid of $108 per pupil, Edgewood had a total of $356 per pupil.
The more affluent Alamo Heights district, levying a tax of only $.85 per $100 assessed
value, was able to raise $333 per pupil above its portion of the state fund. Coupled with a
state appropriation of $225 per pupil and federal aid of $36 per pupil, the district had a total
of $594 per pupil to spend. Id.
I Monies appropriated are earmarked for teachers' salaries, text books, and transportation
costs. Id. at 9.
1 Under the Texas system this means funds over and above the district's contribution to the
Minimum Foundation Program. See note 4 supra.
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ular district, at its discretion, to improve the nature and quality of basic
educational services otherwise provided .
7
With slight variations, this approach is adopted for school financing
in 49 states. s The legislative intent of such plans is to establish state
supported education systems with a maximum degree of local control.9
However, their necessary consequence is to make the financial resources
available for each district's educational needs directly proportionate to its
property wealth."o
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," the resi-
dents of the Edgewood school district brought a class action against Texas
education authorities challenging the validity of a school finance system
which permitted the perpetuation of such funding disparities. The Su-
preme Court was asked to rectify the inequities of this system by applying
federal equal protection standards to state fiscal and educational policies.
Although the Court recognized the seriousness of the issue, it ultimately
discovered no violation of the equal protection clause and identified the
problem as one better suited for the attention of state legislators.'2 In the
For example, the district can pay its teachers a higher salary, thereby attracting more highly
qualified staffs.
Hawaii is the sole exception.
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
The following table illustrates the correlation between a district's property wealth, median
family income and per pupil expenditures:
Market Value of Median Family Total Per Pupil
Taxable Property Income For 1960 Expenditure
Per Pupil
Above $100,000 $5,900 $815
(10 districts)
$100,000-$50,000 $4,425 $544
(26 districts)
$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 $483
(30 districts)
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 $462
(40 districts)
Below $10,000 $3,325 $305
(4 districts)
Id. at 15, n.38.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2 Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, said:
The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various States,
and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separation of powers staying our
hand. We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing
its judicial imprimatur on the status quo . . . . These matters merit the continued
attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But
the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pres-
sures of those who elect them.
Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
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aftermath of this decision and in light of possible avenues of reform
through state courts, it becomes essential to determine which governmen-
tal branch, legislative or judicial, is best equipped to initiate and imple-
ment the needed changes.
FORECLOSURE OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RELIEF
San Antonio was the first lawsuit to reach the Supreme Court chal-
lenging the validity of school district property taxes. 3 This litigation
sought to establish as a doctrine of constitutional law that "the quality of
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state as a whole."" Plaintiffs contended that the Texas system of
school financing denied the children of poor school districts equal protec-
tion of the laws. 5
Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, described the judicial
processes involved in determining whether an equal protection violation
eiisted. He stated:
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public educa-
tion operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,
thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny . . . . If not, the Texas scheme must
still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious dis-
crimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
This two-tiered process of judicial determination may be exemplified
by visualizing a scale. 7 On one side rests the presumption that the state
has acted within its constitutional powers, and the less stringent "reasona-
ble classification" standards will be applicable." On the other side, one
may envision the class of people affected and the interest or right denied.
1' Other lawsuits dealing with this same general question include Van Dusurtz v. Hatfield,
334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
" J. COONS, W. CLUNE, S. SUGERMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIc EDUCATION 2 (1970). See
Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v.
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504, 511 (1972).
San Antonio Ind. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5-6.
" Id. at 17.
See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969);
Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Supreme Court ruled that
"[tlhe constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
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If the class involved is considered "suspect"' 9 or the right "fundamental,"20
the scale will tip and the "strict scrutiny" test will be invoked. Conse-
quently, the state will be forced to display a compelling state interest to
avoid an ultimate resolution that its legislation is violative of the equal
protection clause. 2'
In San Antonio, the issue of invidiousness of wealth discrimination
generally presented little difficulty for the Court. In all cases theretofore
considered, the wealth classification had been reviewed in conjunction
with important interests.2 2 Accordingly, it was deemed impermissable for
a state to deny an important right solely based upon a citizen's indigency.2
"Indigency in itself is neither a source of the right nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral
fact-constitutionally an irrelevance . ".2.."4 Justice Powell recognized,
however, that prior determinations of wealth discrimination were premised
on a finding that members of the disfavored class were, "because of their
impecunity, . . . completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and
as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit." 25 Thus, the inequality generated served
to label the deprived individuals a suspect class.
The San Antonio Court, in considering the presence of a suspect class,
was initially confronted with difficulty in determining the nature of the
persons discriminated against. Justice Powell noted:
The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts
... . The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as discriminat-
ing (1) against "poor" persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable
level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally "indigent," or
For example, if the classification is based on race the law is considered "constitutionally
suspect" and will be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). The McLaughlin Court pointed out that racial classifications must be viewed "in
light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources. 379 U.S. at 192.
" See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
24 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
411 U.S. at 18: see note 24 infra.
23 See Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 435 (1967).
24 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). For instance,
in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the petitioner alleged that errors in his trial would
entitle him to a reversal of the judgment of conviction. He was precluded from obtaining
appellate review because of a lack of funds to purchase a trial transcript. The Court held that
a central theme of our criminal justice system is that all defendants "stand on an equality
before the bar of justice." Id. at 17. If a state could discriminate on the basis of wealth, the
guarantee of a trial would be a sham.
Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), indigent
residents of Virginia were barred from voting in state elections because of their inability to
pay a poll tax. Here the Court stated that "[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process." Id. at 668.
411 U.S. at 20.
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(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all
those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in rela-
tively poorer school districts.
The Court concluded that the record could not support the first two possi-
bilities.17 The third classification was acceptable to the Court but was
deemed too "large, diverse and amorphous" to be considered suspect.,,
Moreover, the class did not suffer an absolute deprivation of any benefit
since the Minimum Foundation Program provided some financing for the
education of Edgewood children.2" Finally, since the record failed to con-
clusively establish a correlation between the deprivations of "poor" school
districts and "poor" people, the Court was unwilling to extend the "tradi-
tional indicia" of suspectness as established in previous cases to the plain-
tiffs.,,,
Having rejected plaintiffs' assertions of a suspect class, the Court next
confronted the difficult task of determining whether education should be
numbered among the constitutionally protected fundamental rights.3 The
crux of the problem lay in the word "fundamental." Its meaning and role
in the Court's review of legislative action has been a troublesome question
and one which has been the subject of longstanding debate within the
Supreme Court.
3 2
Two extreme views have been articulated with respect to the range
encompassed by the term "fundamental rights" and hence by the strict
scrutiny test. Mr. Justice Harlan felt the concept had no place in equal
"6 Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-27. See chart, note 10 supra. While the chart displays a correlation between
district property wealth and per pupil expenditures, it shows only a partial correlation be-
tween district median family wealth and per pupil expenditures. For example, districts hav-
ing per pupil, taxable property with market values of from $10,000-30,000 have a median
family income of $5,050. On the other hand, in districts having per pupil, property values of
from $50,000-100,000, the median family income is only $4,425.
A similar study conducted in Kansas indicates little correlation between a district's
wealth based upon assessed property valuation and the wealth of its residents. Ridenour &
Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 KAN. L. REv. 213 (1972).
See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L. J. 1303 (1972).
411 U.S. at 28.
"Id.
Id. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also note 24 supra.
'1 If a law impinges on a "fundamental" right it will be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny."
For example, the Supreme Court has characterized the right to vote as fundamental. See
McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Election, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynold v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). A similar
determination was made with respect to the right of privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11 The origins of the debate can be traced back to the eighteenth century case of Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). While reviewing the validity of an act of the Connecticut
Legislature, Justice Chase referred to "fundamental law." Id. at 386-87. He stated that he
could not
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protection cases. : He reasoned that the exception "threatens to swallow"
the standard equal protection rule and argued: "[W]hen the right af-
fected is one assured by the federal Constitution any infringement can be
dealt with under the Due Process Clause."3 It was the Justice's feeling that
any important rights are within the regulation of the state legislatures, and
to extend judicial powers in this direction "would go far toward making
this Court a 'super-legislature.' "3 In contrast, Justice Marshall has ap-
proached the entire equal protection question as one not of strict or lenient
judicial review, but rather as one requiring a "sliding scale" or "spectrum
of standards."3 Rather than identify a right as fundamental per se, he
would
scrutinize particular classifications depending on . . . the Constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legislature, or that it is absolute and without
control . . . There are certain vital principles in our free Republican government,
which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power
Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added). In dicta the Justice went on to say that permitting legisla-
tures to violate these principles would amount to "political heresy, altogether inadmissible
in our free republican governments." Id. at 388-89. (emphasis added).
In rebuttal, Justice Iredell took the position that the judicial power of the Court is limited
to reviewing the constitutional validity of legislative action. Id. at 398-99. If the legislature
shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the court
cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to
the principles of natural justice.
Id. at 399.
:1 In his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969), Mr. Justice
Harlan commented:
I think that this branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine is sound when
applied to racial classifications, for historically the Equal Protection Clause was
largely a product of the desire to eradicate legal distinctions founded upon race. How-
ever, I believe that the more recent extensions have been unwise ....
[Wheni a classification is based upon the exercise of rights guaranteed against
state infringement by the Federal Constitution, then there is no need for any resort
to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this Court may properly and
straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden upon those rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Id. at 659. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
31 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 33 supra.
Id. Mr. Justice Harlan further observed:
Virtually every state statute affects important rights. This Court has repeatedly held,
for example, that the traditional equal protection standard is applicable to statutory
classifications affecting such fundamental matters as the right to pursue a particular
occupation, the right to receive greater or smaller wages or to work more or less hours,
and the right to inherit property . . . . [T]o extend the "compelling interest" rule to
all cases in which such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a
"super-legislature".
Id.
:" San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn
37
Thus, the scope of the Court's review in this area would be substantially
increased.:"
Yet a third, somewhat more moderate approach was articulated by
Justice Stewart, concurring in Shapiro v. Thompson:"5
The Court does not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them
as 'fundamental', and give them added protection .... " To the contrary,
the Court simply recognizes . . . an established constitutional right, and
gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands."°
This approach was adopted by Justice Powell as the basis for determining
which rights and interests should be afforded the extra-ordinary protection
of the strict scrutiny test.4" The equal protection clause was to be used as
a vehicle for guarding existing rights, since "it is not the province of the
Court to create substantive Constitutional rights in the name of guarantee-
ing equal protection of the laws. ' 4 Under this view, the proper test for
ascertaining a fundamental right involves a determination of whether the
Constitution either explicitly or implicitly guarantees it.'
3
It was thus determined by the San Antonio Court that education was
not a right guaranteed by the Constitution.4 Rejecting plaintiffs' argument
that the right can be implied because of a nexus between education and
27 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting),
quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). Justice Marshall commented:
[Cloncentration [is] placed upon the character of the classification . . . the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental bene-
fits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classifica-
tion.
Id.
: In San Antonio, Justice Powell stated that if a fundamental interest were to be determined
by its importance "[wle would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role and one for which
the Court lacks both authority and competence." 411 U.S. at 31. See note 35 supra. See
generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Forward, In Search of Evolving Doctrines
in a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
' 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
"IId. Interestingly, this concurring opinion was written in response to Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
411 U.S. at 33.
I Id. The Court relied on Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) and Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). Mr. Justice Powell felt these cases provided the Court with a clear
"lesson" as to the proper test for determination of fundamental rights. 411 U.S. at 33.
In Lindsey, the Court refused to treat housing as a fundamental right. Justice White,
speaking for the Court, stated that "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill . . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of ade-
quate housing . . . [is] a legislative, not judicial, [function]." 405 U.S. at 74.
In Dandridge, the Court, while recognizing the importance of welfare assistance, applied
the reasonable basis test. The lesson to be learned is that societal importance alone does not
serve as an adequate basis for departing from the lenient equal protection test.
13 411 U.S. at 33, 34.
1 Id. at 35-40. Despite this conclusion, the Court recognized the tremendous importance of
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freedom of speech and the right to vote, 5 Justice Powell commented that
the Constitution does not guarantee "the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice."" Moreover, it would be difficult to determine
the amount of education necessary to preserve these rights were education
to be recognized as fundamental. 7 Nothing in the record indicated that the
Texas Minimum Foundation Program would be unable to pass such consti-
tutional muster.' s
Failing to find either a suspect classification or a fundamental right,
the Court in San Antonio abandoned strict scrutiny for the "reasonable
basis" test."5 According the Texas legislation the presumption of constitu-
tionality,"0 the Court concluded that that state's school financing "is not
education in our society and reaffirmed its commitment to public education:
lE]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments
... . Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
Id. at 29-30, quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This emphatic
statement, despite the Court's rejection of education as a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution, indicates how firmly rooted in the Constitution an interest must be before the
"strict scrutiny" test will be applied.
5 Id. The argument for an implied right to education is inherently vulnerable. In Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court found an implied right to privacy. The Court's
rationale was that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy.
Id. at 484 (citations omitted). Couched in these terms, the right of privacy can be said to
"flow" from explicit constitutional guarantees. Education would not "flow" as a continuum
from the right of free speech and the right to vote, but rather forms a foundation to support
these rights. Education is, therefore, one step removed from the right itself.
" 411 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 36-37. The Court pointed out that one of the most controversial aspects of the case
was the lack of any demonstrable correlation between per pupil expenditures and the quality
of education. Id. at 42-43. See Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and
School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1239 (1973).
' 411 U.S. at 36-37.
" See note 18 supra.
' 411 U.S. at 36-37. The Court has defined its role in judicial review of legislative action in
McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819):
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib-
ited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited
by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government, it would
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the result of hurried, ill-conceived legislation," 5' but rather "the product
of responsible studies by qualified people."5 The majority was unwilling
to place its judgment above that of the scholars and legislators who had
developed and enacted the system .5 3 Consequently, Texas' school financing
plan was not found to violate the equal protection clause.
San Antonio is indicative of the complexities inherent in seeking solu-
tions to racial and state fiscal problems on constitutional grounds. The
advisability of judicial restraint may well be warranted and can be illus-
trated by applying both the two-tiered approach and the sliding scale
standard to a hypothetical problem. The facts of Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw5 Will serve as a model. This case presents a relatively straightfor-
ward fact pattern involving a denial of equal protection in a municipality's
rendering of services. By setting aside the issue of educational finance,
with its attendant emotional aspects, the "correctness" of Justice Powell's
approach can be established in a purely objective manner.
In Hawkins, plaintiffs adduced exhaustive statistical evidence which
showed that Shaw was divided into two well-defined neighborhoods, one
populated by poor blacks, the other by relatively affluent whites.55 The
figures showed that out of a total population of 2500, 1500 were black.
These blacks occupied 451 dwelling units, 97 percent of which were located
in areas in which no whites resided." These statistics further displayed a
gross disparity in the quantity and quality of municipal services provided
the two neighborhoods. For example, 98 percent of all homes that fronted
on unpaved streets were occupied by blacks, and 97 percent of the homes
not served by sanitary sewers were in black neighborhoods." On these facts
plaintiffs contend that invidious discrimination by the Town of Shaw,
violative of the equal protection clause, was clearly demonstrated. More-
over, they argued that the racial and wealth classification required the
court to apply the strict scrutiny test.58
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not
prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the govern-
ment, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass
the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground. This court disclaims all pretension to such a power.
Id. at 421-23 (emphasis added).
1, 411 U.S. at 55.
52 Id.
53 Id.
11 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), adhered to by a divided court en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972).
For a thorough discussion of the implications of this case see Fessler & Haar, Beyond the
Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARv. Civ.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 441 (1971). See Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972).
: 437 F.2d at 1288.
50 Id.
' Id. at 1288-91.
rA Id.
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For purposes of this hypothetical we will assume that the disfavored
neighborhood is not predominantly populated by a racial minority, a sus-
pect class in itself." Consequently, the alleged suspect classification would
be wealth; the interests affected would encompass the availability of typi-
cal municipal services, such as sewers, street lighting, and other public
improvements. Under Justice Powell's approach the threshold question to
be resolved is which of the two equal protection tests is applicable. Strict
judicial scrutiny will not be invoked unless the indigency of the disfavored
class can be shown to result in an absolute deprivation of the affected
interest. Furthermore, the affected interest would have to involve a right
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Absent these con-
ditions, the "reasonableness" approach must be invoked.
Assuming the disfavored class can be clearly identified as "poor" peo-
ple, Justice Powell would concede that such a class might arguably satisfy
the "indicia of suspectness" recognized by the Court in wealth discrimina-
tion cases."' However, the requirement of an absolute deprivation of a
benefit precludes wealth in and of itself as a suspect classification." Fur-
thermore, the conservative tone pervading the San Antonio opinion would
seem to indicate that the Court would be unwilling to invoke the strict
scrutiny test unless the indigency interfered with a fundamental right.2 In
the hypothetical situation, the adversely affected interests are merely
municipal services. Therefore, the Court would ultimately use the more
lenient standard rather than the strict scrutiny test." Indeed, Justice Pow-
ell's test would accord the hypothetical town a presumption of constitu-
tionality and only invalidate the town's actions if no reasonable basis could
be shown to justify the disparities. The Court would not be assuming any
legislative role, but would be merely ascertaining the reasonableness of the
classification.
Alternatively, under Justice Marshall's approach the Court would
engage in a delicate balancing process. The question of the invidiousness
of the class would not be limited to a "reflection of historic prejudices.""4
"' See note 19 supra.
' 411 U.S. at 22.
I Id.
I d. at 18-19.
: See note 18 supra.
" 411 U.S. at 105. Justice Marshall commented that the classifications based upon race,
nationality, or alienage are considered highly suspect because "lines drawn on such bases are
frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative rationality." Id. These
groups have been recognized as" 'discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless
to protect their interests in the political process." Id.
He went on to say that these groups are to be contrasted with commercial interests "that
have more than enough power to protect themselves in the legislative halls." Id. at 109,
quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The variable
standard test would respond to the powerlessness of the affected group. Apparently, whether
or not the disfavored minority can be classified in racial or ethnic terms is irrelevant. 411 U.S.
at 109. But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1974
Rather, special care would be taken to protect the interests of "particularly
disadvantaged and powerless" classes. 5 Thus, an economically disadvan-
taged neighborhood, especially one in a condition of abject poverty, could
be considered suspect even without the taint of racial discrimination."
Furthermore, the interests affected need not be rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, for the test is "to determine the extent to which constitution-
ally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the
Constitution." 7 Justice Marshall would not be bound by an a priori defini-
tion of the right. Instead, "concentration must be placed upon . . . the
relative importance to the individual in the class discriminated against of
the governmental benefit that they do not receive.""8 Municipal services
sustain what has been described as the "immediate environment."69
Though not essential to subsistence, they do contribute substantially to
the quality of life and thus might require stricter scrutiny than is applied
under the Powell rationale.
The operation of the "varying" scrutiny test in the hypothetical case
illustrates its major weakness. It transforms the Court into a "super-
legislature." A consideration of the powerlessness of the class and relative
importance of the benefit could greatly deviate from constitutional consid-
erations. Concentration would tend toward the social impact of the statu-
tory scheme rather than its legality. 0 Using this test, societal, as well as
constitutional, importance would defeat the presumption of validity and
subject the state legislature's actions to a more rigid scrutiny.
These considerations, though important, are extra-constitutional. The
' 411 U.S. at 109.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See Fessler & Forrester, The Case for the Immediate Environment, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1(1970).
"I In Hawkins, the Fifth Circuit was mindful of the fact that judicial intervention of this
nature tends to contravene separation of powers doctrines. 437 F.2d at 1292. It commented
that:
[tihe need for judicially discoverable and manageable standards as well as an aware-
ness of the distinctions between the roles played by the coordinate branches of govern-
ment must, of course, be foremost in our mind.
Id. Ordinarily, the nature and extent of services expended within a community is considered
an exercise of the municipality's discretionary powers and beyond judicial review. 13 E.
McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 37.25 (3d ed. 1971). A court should
intervene only if it is "clearly satisfied that the action is oppressive and without reasonable
grounds." Id.
The Hawkins court viewed its role in Madisonian "checks and balances" terms:
Indeed 'unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give each a
constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim re-
quires as essential to a free government can never in practice be duly maintained'.
437 F.2d at 1292, quoting MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 48. Thus the court limited its power
to constitutional control. The statistical evidence indicated a racial discrimination clearly
violative of the fourteenth amendment. See note 19 supra. Therefore, the court's holding was
in purely constitutional terms.
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facts germane to the inquiry would be the same general facts that are used
for making law or policy or for guiding the exercise of discretion. The Court
may well refer to the same data used by the town council in enacting the
statutory scheme under review. Such a process clearly would be judicial
legislation, at odds with checks and balances principles.7'
The question of what should be the Court's proper role is indeed a
difficult one. In Justice Marshall's view, the equal protection clause em-
bodies a broad legal command to protect all those rights deemed funda-
mental to mankind. While in the abstract this seems a sound doctrine of
social justice, in practice it results in the erosion of traditional principles
of the separation of powers and federalism. Greater scrutiny will increase
the accountability of the state legislature, a body elected by the people to
carry out their collective will, to the will of a comparatively small number
of judges.
Justice Powell's approach, on the other hand, is mindful of the status
of the various branches of the government. As he has noted:
[W]e stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the
Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the
raising and disposition of public revenues."
Consequently, his minimal scrutiny test is sensitive to the separation of
powers doctrine by according broad discretion in these matters to the
legislative branch. This discretionary power enables the legislature to
apply its expertise to formulate sound solutions to complex problems. Con-
versely, Justice Marshall's sliding scale test would place a significant por-
tion of this discretionary power in the judiciary, thus transforming the
court into a "super-legislature." The legislative nature of the issue of
school financing appears to dictate that the legislature retain uninhibited
power to formulate an effective solution and, thus, Justice Powell's view
appears superior.
STATE JUDICIAL RESPONSES
Although San Antonio precluded the finding of a solution within the
provisons of the federal Constitution, school district property tax systems
in both California and New Jersey have been invalidated by the highest
courts of those states on state constitutional grounds." Since most state
constitutions deal with education explicitly, 4 an approach through their
provisions is readily available. As a result, the judiciary would not appear
" See note 69 supra.
72 411 U.S. at 41.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1954); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1968); ILL. CONsT. art.
X, § 1 (1970); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1938).
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to be overstepping its bounds in breach of the separation of powers
doctrine.
California
Article IX, section 1 of the California state constitution provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the pres-
ervation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encour-
age by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral and
agricultural improvement.7 5
Such language dictated the conclusion reached by the California Supreme
Court in Serrano v. Priest.7" There, education was deemed a fundamental
right under the state constitution. Accordingly, the California Legislature
was bound to implement high standards of equal protection in promulgat-
ing a school financing program. Indeed, the court in remanding the case
to the trial court took the position that it is a "cherished idea of American
education that in a democratic society free public schools shall make
equally available to all children the abundant gifts of learning."77 The
court concluded its opinion by quoting Horace Mann:
[N]atural law . . . proves the absolute right to an education of every
human being that comes into the world, and which, of course, proves the
correlative duty of every government to see that the means of that education
are provided for all . . .
On remand the defendants in Serrano asserted that judicial interfer-
ence in the controversy would be violative of the separation of powers
doctrine. Additionally, they maintained that judicial involvement would
serve to inhibit the California Legislature's enactment of innovative, ex-
perimental educational programs.79 In responding to these allegations, the
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1954).
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The Serrano court was asked to
invalidate the California public school finance system. As in Texas, the system was substan-
tially dependent on local property taxes with resultant disparities in school revenues. 487 P.2d
at 1244.
The California Supreme Court based its argument primarily on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the complainant also alleged a violation of
the equal protection provisions of the California Constitution. In a footnote to its opinion,
the Serrano court stated that these provisions are treated as "substantially the equivalent"
of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The court added that "conse-
quently, our analysis of plaintiffs' federal equal protection contention is also applicable to
their claim under these state constitutional provisions." 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11. On remand,
the trial court read this footnote to mean that the holding in Serrano was unaffected by San
Antonio since the California court's reasoning could be based either on the United States or
California Constitutions. Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 (L.A. Super. Ct., April 10, 1974).
11 5 Cal. 3d at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
79 Id.
11 Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 at 37 (L.A. Super. Ct., April 10, 1974). The California
Supreme Court had remanded the case for trial. The trial court ruled on matters of law in
light of San Antonio.
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trial court asserted that the power to determine whether the school finance
system breached the equal protection clause of the state constitution
rested with the judiciary."0 Consequently, plaintiffs were entitled to judi-
cial relief upon a showing that the alleged discriminatory treatment in fact
existed.'
The defendants further contended that if the court invalidated the
educational finance system on equal protection grounds, it could likewise
invalidate the local financing of other highly important governmental serv-
ices, such as police and fire protection." These functions had also been
delegated by the California constitution to the legislative and executive
branches, and it was argued that an expansion of judicial power along
these lines would be illogical and impractical. The court used article lX,
section 1 to invalidate this argument. Since education is a special govern-
mental service singled out by the drafters of the state constitution, conclu-
sions reached with respect to it do not necessarily apply to other govern-
mental services.
The presence of a state constitutional provision relating to education
markedly differentiates the issues presented to the courts of California
from the federal question reviewed by Justice Powell in San Antonio.
Though the argument may be raised that the problem is essentially a
legislative matter, the specific emphasis placed on education in the state
constitution greatly militates against the removal of such a fundamental
right from the purview of the state judiciary . 3 The absence of a like provi-
sion in the federal Constitution seemingly justifies the resolution of the
issue enunciated in San Antonio. The fact that resolution by judicial pro-
cesses can be defended on legal grounds does not guarantee that the court's
assumption of an essentially legislative role will prove viable in achieving
the desired result. The problem of educational finances has complex eco-
nomic and political dimensions which may place serious obstacles in the
path of ultimate judicial remediation. Defendants' assertion that the cause
of action does not present a judicially manageable controversy may ulti-
mately be correct. A legislature free to innovate and experiment may prove
the only effective means for formulating an equitable solution.
Events in California indicate that the court may be encountering diffi-
culty in enforcing its judgment. The Serrano court remanded the matter
to the trial court to ascertain the truth of the factual allegations of the
plaintiffs' complaint.84 In the interim, to alleviate the immediate problem,
Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 at 37-38 (L.A. Super. Ct., April 10, 1974).
'I Id.
2 Id. at 38. Defendants' position on remand was that such "vitally important" governmental
functions may also be considered "fundamental rights" under the California Supreme Court's
rationale in Serrano. This would require the state to demonstrate a "compelling state inter-
est" to avoid invalidation of the funding systems for such services. The result would be a
judicial assumption of legislative and executive functions.
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1954).
See Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 (L.A. Super. Ct., April 10, 1974).
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the California Legislature passed the "Property Tax Relief Act of 1972."1 5
On remand, the trial judge ruled the Act did not meet the mandate of
Serrano and entered a judgment which required
[that] the trial court [retain] jurisdiction of this action so that any of the
parties may apply for appropriate relief in the event that relevant circum-
stances develop such as a failure by the legislative and executive branches
of the state government to take the necessary steps to establish, within a
reasonable time, a public school financing system that complies with the
equal-protection-of-the-laws provisions of the California Constitution."
This judgment implies that California's legislative and executive branches
were given a time limit in which to enact legislation acceptable to the trial
court or else be compelled to follow explicit court instructions. Thus, the
court assumed the role of a super-legislature. The inevitable tension be-
tween the co-equal branches of the state government which this decision
may engender hardly creates an atmosphere conducive to thorough and
imaginative educational reform.
New Jersey
Similarly, in Robinson v. Cahill,8" the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated that state's system of school district property taxation. How-
ever, rather than rely on federal equal protection standards, the Robinson
court focused on the education clause of the New Jersey constitution,
which states:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough
and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the chil-
dren in the state .... 88
The court concluded that the current system, with its resultant inequities,
could not be considered a "thorough and efficient" system." Consequently,
it ordered the Governor and legislators to restructure the state's educa-
tional finance system prior to December 1974.1
The special treatment accorded education by the New Jersey constitu-
tion again may justify judicial intervention in this area. However, as in
11 Id. at 3. The annual state aid appropriation was to be increased in proportion to
inflationary increases in real property values. Moreover, a freeze was imposed on the maxi-
mum expenditures allowed by individual school districts. Id. at 12, 14.
Id. at 106.
- 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). Under the New Jersey school finance system, 67 percent
of the funds for education were derived from local property taxes. Disparities in per pupil
expenditures existed and state aid did not equalize school district funding. Id. at -, 303
A.2d at 276-77.
1 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, IV, para. 1. For a thorough discussion of this case and its implications
see Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill
Points the Way, 27 RurEas L. REV. 365 (1974).
62 N.J. at __, 303 A.2d at 295.
Id. at __, 303 A.2d 298; N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
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California, subsequent events indicate that the controversy may not be
judicially manageable. Though the Robinson court did not invalidate the
local property tax as a means of raising school funds, it indicated that a
local property tax would be unacceptable as a main source for school
finance." Consequently, the executive and legislative branches were con-
strained to seek alternative methods of financing.
In response to the court, the Governor proposed a state income tax to
shift a portion of the local tax burden to the state. In the past, the imposi-
tion of a state income tax had been one of the most controversial and
emotional matters considered by the New Jersey Legislature. 2 It had been
conceded by New Jersey governors for the last forty years that the state's
residents were burdened with the most regressive and inequitable tax sys-
tems in the nation. 3 Yet no recent governor has been able to muster suffi-
cient support to pass a reformed income tax bill. Though liberals among
the state legislators felt a state income tax was necessary to eliminate the
unfair tax burdens on certain New Jersey residents," conservatives viewed
it as a threat to local control.
With the court-imposed deadline, pressure to resolve the issue was
intensified thereby accelerating the passage of an income tax bill in the
state assembly.15 Certain leaders of the state senate, however, indicated
their opposition to the bill by presenting the Governor with an ultimatum
to either withdraw the bill or suffer a "humiliating" defeat." As a result,
the Governor yielded to political pressures and withdrew the bill, pledging
not to re-introduce an income tax measure for at least two years. 7 This
defeat raised the distinct possibility of a constitutional confrontation be-
tween the New Jersey Legislature and the State Supreme Court. The Leg-
islature's steadfast refusal to enact the most viable option to the property
tax makes it unlikely that an acceptable alternative will be forthcoming
prior to the court deadline of December 1974.
Although Robinson and Serrano offer an alternative to consideration
of school financing as a federal equal protection issue, they are demonstra-
tive of the grave difficulties involved in enforcing such decisions. The
distinctions between the judiciary and other branches become blurred and
tensions between them are heightened. As one author stated: "The no-
wealth principle poses a problem of ultimate remediation of a far greater
order because nothing short of the court's assumption of the taxing powers
would assure compliance.""8
" 62 N.J. at - , 303 A.2d at 288.
' N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
. Id. at 39, col. 7.
1 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
11 N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, at 1, col. 1. The bill was passed in the state assembly by the
narrow margin of 41-38. The proposal generated several hours of intense debate and its
passage was unexpected. Id.
,1 N.Y. Times, July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
97 Id.
11 Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1254 (1973).
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THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE
New York provides an example of a state in which the problem of
evenhanded school financing has been handled in the political forum
rather than the judicial one. Indeed, New York's attempts to eradicate
disparities in the quality of education pre-date judicial admonitions
against the property tax system. During October 1969, former Governor
Rockefeller created the N'ew York State Commission on the Quality, Cost
and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education, informally known
as the Fleischmann Commission.9 The Commission's 18 members, who
included educators, lawyers, legislators, and businessmen, 00 were given
the awesome task of developing means "to get a lot better education for a
lot less money."'' With complete independence and the aid of a 26 mem-
ber staff and 60 consultants, the Commission began a massive research
effort to analyze problems and formulate recommendations for the legisla-
ture.' 02
The Commission found that, as in the Texas school district, great
disparities in per pupil expenditures existed in New York.' 3 It concluded
that the "quality of a child's education was being 'determined by accidents
of birth, wealth and geography'" and further found it
unconscionable that a poor man in a poor district must often pay at higher
rates for the inferior education of his child than the man of means in a rich
district pays for the superior education of his child.' 4
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, at 48, col. 1. The Commission was named for Manly Fleisch-
mann, a Buffalo attorney who served as its head.
I Id.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 34, col. 5.
102 N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, at 48, col. 1. Over the course of the next two years public
hearings would be held throughout the state and more than five million items of numerical
data would be processed.
Id. To illustrate the problem two Long Island school districts can be compared:
Great Neck, L. I. Levittown, L. I.
Revenues From Local $1,684.07 $410.31
Property Tax
Revenues From Other 29.29 13.87
Local Sources
State Aid 364.16 764.48
Federal Aid --- .71
Total Per Pupil $2,077.52 $1,189.37
Expenditures
Assessed Property $64,000 $16,200
Per Pupil
Tax Rate $2.72 per $100 $2.72 per $100
Id. at 48, col. 3-5.
"ll N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
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The Commission recommended a radical departure from the present sys-
tem, suggesting that the state assume full responsibility for the financing
of public education. 0 5 The proposed plan called for the implementation of
a uniform, state-wide property tax.' 6
The Commission report only initiated the state's movement toward
reform," 7 and provided, at best, a basis for later legislation.'- s Indeed, the
controversial nature of the Commission's proposal caused the legislators to
greet the plan as "food for thought, not action."'0 9 They predicted and
promised "extensive debate" and careful study of the proposals." 0
The major flaw of the Fleischmann Commission's plan was its concen-
tration on educational reform, to the exclusion of political and economic
realities. The state's mixture of urban, suburban, and rural districts natu-
rally provides an atmosphere in which radical changes in financing will
meet with active opposition from some quarters. Moreover, since the Com-
mission estimated the cost of the plan as an additional annual state ex-
penditure of $715 million,"' the availability of funds would be determina-
tive of the question whether legislative action would be forthcoming."'
Concurrent with the Fleischmann proposal, Governor Rockefeller, a Re-
publican, was supporting a compromise state tax bill to overcome a $1.5
billion deficit. Democratic leaders in the Legislature offered support for the
tax bill in return for a "letter of intent" from Republicans assuring certain
minimal appropriations, including $2.5 billion for education. The Republi-
I5 Id.
"" Id. The Commission estimated that a state-wide property tax rate set at $2.04 per $100 of
assessed value would be able to increase the amounts now raised locally.
Under the proposed plan the wealthier districts would be "held harmless" that is, they
would not be forced to reduce their current expenditures. Rather, the 474 districts which make
up the poorest two-thirds of all districts would have their per pupil expenditures increased
to the levels of the wealthier districts over a three-year period. Id.
,,,7 Manly Fleischmann commented:
Whatever we've written isn't gospel until its agreed upon by the Legislature and the
Governor. I've never yet seen a plan survive intact, and I don't think this is going to
be the first.
Id. State Senator Thomas LaVerne, a member of the Commission and Chairman of the
Senate Education Committee, admitted that consideration of the proposals by the State
Legislature "might take several years." Id.
Id.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Assemblywoman Constance E. Cook, Chairwoman
of the Assembly Education Committee and member of the Fleischmann Commission, com-
mented: "I don't think there's any real plan or intention to adopt this in-toto this year." Id.
Id.
Id. Senate Majority Leader Earl W. Brydges reportedly stated that the state's current
fiscal crisis made the adoption of the Commission's proposals unrealistic. Id. See notes 114-
15 and accompanying text infra. Other state legislatures voiced an objection to any continued
reliance on a property tax and suggested a more equitable means to finance education such
as an income tax. Id.
112 Id.
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cans' refusal heightened the fiscal crisis'1 3 and foreshadowed the doom of
the Fleischmann plan."'
Though the extensive factual findings of the Commission may have
demonstrated a need for concrete reforms, they merely produced a spirited
debate. Two legislative sessions passed without even a token movement
toward change. However, in the summer of 1973, a joint effort by the
Governor, Legislature and Board of Regents resulted in the creation of a
special Task Force on State Aid for Elementary and Secondary Schools."'
Two years after the Fleischmann report the Task Force submitted its own
proposals for reform. Rather than suggesting a major overhaul of the local
property tax system, the proposal called for a revision of the state aid
formula." '6 The limited recommendation was a reflection of the Task
Force's sensitivity to political realities." 7 To further reduce political oppo-
sition, the Task Force emphasized a re-working of the school financing
formula, leaving the ultimate cost an open-ended issue."8
The limited reform proposal, fortuitously presented in an election
year, gave rise to sufficient political pressure to assure some legislative
action. By April 1974, the Governor and legislative leaders were meeting
in an attempt to work out a new state aid formula."' The major obstacle
was again an economic one.12
The bill, which generally followed the Task Force recommendations,
was finally introduced on April 4, 1974. A $221 million state aid increase
was appropriated, apparently representing a compromise between the
Governor and the suburban bloc.' The ceiling on per pupil grants was
increased from $860 to $1200. Under the bill's provisions, what percentage
of the $1200 a particular school district will receive depends upon the
property value within that district.'22 In addition, each student within the
N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1972, § 4, at 11, col. 3.
"' N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 1. With the failure of the attempted compromise
between Republicans and Democrats, the Governor outlined an alternative plan to raise
additional revenues. The plan called for increases in a number of state taxes, a $275 million
freeze in state aid and postponements of $400 million in state obligations. Id. at 24, col. 3.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1974, at 74, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, at 26, col. 1. The Task Force, apparently sensitive to the
controversial nature of the problem, did not suggest any radical change from the local prop-
erty tax. Rather, the Task Force "talked of providing incentives for local districts to share
resources with each other." Id.
"I Several weeks prior to the issuance of the report, Assembly Speaker Perry B. Duryea had
predicted that a proposal for an increase in state aid to education would receive a favorable
response in the Legislature, although any significant property tax reform would still meet
with resistance. Id.
"I Id. However, the Task Force did imply that some additional state money would be neces-
sary.
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1974, at 22, col. 4.
' The Governor sought a $204 million budgetary package while a powerful group of legisla-
tors from suburban districts wanted a $260 million increase. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1974, at
21, col. 5.
121 Id.
'2 N.Y. Times, April 26, 1974, at 73, col. 6. As an example of the increase in state aid which
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district who is designated a "pupil with special educational needs" (one
who scores below a pre-determined level on state achievement tests) will
be counted as 1.25 students.' In unanimous action by the assembly, and
a vote of 55 to 2 in the Senate, the Legislature passed the bill as chapter
241 of the 1974 Sessions Laws.'
The success of the legislation, and that of any additional reforms it
may engender, remains to be seen. Perhaps a future legislature will imple-
ment the Fleischmann Commission report and have the state assume full
financial responsibility for elementary and secondary education. In any
event, by implementing reform through the majoritarian political process,
New York will have avoided the pitfalls of a plan hurriedly conceived to
satisfy a court order.
The efforts of the various executive, legislative, and investigatory bod-
ies in New York amply illustrate the myriad political and economic dimen-
sions of a problem which has been presented to the courts in other states.
Events in California and New Jersey'2 indicate the possible tensions that
may explode between the executive, legislative and judicial branches when
the judiciary attempts to accomplish economic and educational reform by
applying broad legal theories. The separation of powers doctrine should be
a crucial consideration in determining the scope of judicial review of legis-
lative programs. The legislature must be free to consider, negotiate, reject
and reconsider plans for reform without the restraint of a court mandate.
CONCLUSION
The importance of education in today's complex society cannot be
overstated. The present school district approach to financing education,
with its potential for inequities, presents a problem of first magnitude.
However, inherent in the pursuit of reform of this system is the trouble-
some question of where such reform should originate.
The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the resolution to
the problem is to be found in the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion. Expressing a sensitivity to the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court took cognizance of the complexities of the situation and the need for
the new formula will provide, property-poor Levittown again may be compared to affluent
Great Neck. State aid to Levittown will be increased from $12,960,375 to $14,569,274, an
increase of 12.2 percent, whereas state aid to Great Neck will be raised only 7.9 percent from
$3,213,202 to $3,467,480. See note 103 supra.
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1974, at 22, col. 4.
12, The Act, calling for a $307 million budgetary increase, was passed just 24 hours after a
hard won compromise was granted by the Governor. Id. In approving the bill Governor
Malcolm Wilson made the following comments:
Primary and secondary education are among the most important concerns of the
people of this and every state. Thus it is not surprising that few, if any, subjects before
the Legislature have each year including the current year, stimulated more controversy
than the issue of the financing of elementary'and secondary schools ...
N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1974, at A-251.
125 See notes 84-86, 91-97 and accompanying text supra.
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experimentation to achieve an equitable alternative. These factors, indi-
cating the legislative quality of the problem, weighed heavily in the Court's
decision to limit the judiciary's role.
At the state court level, the question has assumed a different posture.
The special treatment accorded education in state constitutions allowed
the courts of California and New Jersey to strike down their respective
state's school finance systems. Though the state courts presented an alter-
native judicial route, the effectiveness of these decisions in bringing about
actual reform remains to be seen. It may prove impossible for a court to
resolve problems of this nature without assuming a legislative role or invit-
ing a confrontation with the legislative branch.
The most viable source of reform, perhaps, is the legislature. Recent
events in New York demonstrate how opposing political views and eco-
nomic factors play a crucial role in molding reform. Indeed, the problem
presents many elusive elements, such as the correlation of the quality of
education with per pupil expenditures, and the details of a state supported
system affording a maximum degree of local control. Such considerations
require investigation and open debate, functions particularly adapted to
the legislative process.
As the public becomes increasingly aware of the responsibilities of
government, courts will be asked to entertain actions asserting legislative
neglect of educational financing. The educational finance reform issue will
thus test the dimensions of judicial power. Whether a judicially "unman-
ageable" controversy is being asserted should be a primary consideration
of the courts when reviewing such demands. It remains to be seen how
effectively the courts of California and New Jersey have instituted reform.
In sharp contrast to such judicial action is the new school financing
system brought about by the New York Legislature. The success of this
program should be carefully observed to evaluate the merits of legislative
action free from judicial interference.
